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The effect of same-sex marriage laws on different-sex marriage:  
Evidence from the Netherlands 
 
Mircea Trandafir* 
Department of Business and Economics 
University of Southern Denmark 
 
Abstract 
It has long been argued that the legalization of same-sex marriage would have a negative impact 
on marriage. In this paper, I examine what happened to different-sex marriage in the Netherlands 
after the enactment of two laws: in 1998, a law that provided all couples with an institution al-
most identical to marriage—registered partnership—, and in 2001, a law that legalized same-sex 
marriage for the first time in the world. I first construct a synthetic control for the Netherlands 
OECD data for the period 1988–2005 and find that neither law had significant effects on either 
the overall or different-sex marriage rate. I next construct a unique individual-level dataset cov-
ering the period 1995–2005 by combining the Dutch Labor Force Survey and official municipal 
records. The estimates from a discrete-time hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity for the 
first-marriage decision confirm the findings in the aggregate analysis. The effects of the two laws 
are heterogeneous, with presumably more liberal individuals as defined by their residence or 
ethnicity marrying less after both laws and potentially more conservative individuals marrying 
more after each law. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists have long been interested in the effects of various policies on marriage behavior. 
Some of the policies studied are aimed directly at the marriage contract, such as no-fault divorce 
laws (Allen et al., 2006; Rasul, 2006) or minimum age requirements (Blank et al., 2009). Others 
alter the monetary incentives associated with marriage, such as welfare reforms (Bitler et al., 
2004), income taxes (Alm and Whittington, 1999), blood test requirements (Buckles et al., 
2011), or a reduction in the cost of premarital sex (Goldin and Katz, 2002). The common theme 
is that each of these policies altered the value of marriage relative to alternative arrangements. In 
this paper, I study a new policy that could affect the value of marriage, the legalization of same-
sex marriage. 
 The argument that opening the institution of marriage to same-sex couples would affect the 
value of marriage was used to justify amendments to state constitutions, such as Proposition 8 in 
California or the Defense of Marriage Acts, laws meant to protect the federal or state govern-
ments from having to recognize a same-sex marriage performed elsewhere.2 However, the effect 
of same-sex marriage on the institution of marriage is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the legalization of same-sex marriage could reduce the incentives to marry if it changes social 
norms toward alternative family forms (Kurtz, 2004b). On the other hand, it could lead to more 
different-sex marriages by reigniting the interest in marriage, by reducing the pressure on gov-
ernment and employers to provide marriage-like benefits to cohabiting couples, or by pushing 
different-sex couples to reclaim the institution of marriage (Safire, 2003; Rauch, 2004). 
                                                 
2
 By the end of 2008, Congress and 40 states had enacted such acts (Stateline.org, 2009), with 30 states having con-
stitutional amendments that specifically defined marriage as the union between a man and a woman. 
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 The empirical evidence on the effect of same-sex marriage on the institution of marriage is 
limited and consists mostly of case studies (e.g., Eskridge and Spedale, 2006) or graphical anal-
yses of aggregate data.3 To date, only two studies attempt to address the issue of causality be-
tween same-sex unions and different-sex marriage. Graham and Barr (2008) reject the hypothesis 
that an increase in unmarried same-sex couples Granger-causes more different-sex unmarried 
couples using data on US states between 2000 and 2006. While addressing causality, the authors 
acknowledge that they cannot answer the question whether same-sex marriage would cause few-
er different-sex marriages. Langbein and Yost (2009) estimate difference-in-difference models 
using US state-level data and find no statistically significant effects on marriage, divorce, abor-
tion and out-of-wedlock births in states allowing same-sex marriage or civil unions. One concern 
is that these findings could be caused by time-varying factors that are correlated with both the 
introduction of same-sex marriage and the outcomes analyzed, such as trends in social norms.  
 In this paper, I study the effects of same-sex marriage on different-sex marriage in the Neth-
erlands. There are several reasons for this setting. The Netherlands offers the longest time-series 
of same-sex marriages, being the first country to legalize same-sex marriage in 2001. Second, the 
Dutch legislature introduced in 1998 registered partnership, an institution identical to marriage in 
almost every respect and, unlike the Scandinavian registered partnership, also open to different-
sex couples. This offers the unique opportunity to distinguish between a change in the marriage 
rate and a change in the rate of union formalization, and also for a partial distinction between the 
effects of same-sex marriage versus granting same-sex couples the same rights and benefits 
                                                 
3
 See Kurtz (2004a,b,c, 2006a,b) for interpretations of the aggregate data as showing a negative effect of same-sex 
marriage laws on marriage and family formation, and Badgett (2004a,b, 2009) for interpretations of no effect. 
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through an alternative institution. Finally, the argument that legalizing same-sex marriage would 
affect the institution of marriage was also used in the Netherlands.4 
 I first conduct my analysis at the aggregate level. Using data on the 16 OECD member coun-
tries that did not enact same-sex marriage or registered partnership laws by 2005 and the synthet-
ic control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010), I con-
struct a counterfactual for the Dutch marriage rate in the absence of the two laws. This method, 
unlike previous approaches using aggregate data, takes into account both observed and unob-
served determinants of the marriage rate. Regardless of whether I focus on all marriages or only 
different-sex marriages, a comparison of the Dutch marriage rate to the synthetic marriage rate 
shows an insignificant increase after the registered partnership law followed by an insignificant 
decrease after the same-sex marriage law. I then turn to a unique and highly confidential individ-
ual-level data set including demographic characteristics as well as information on marriage over 
the period 1995–2005 for approximately 10% of the Dutch population, which I use to estimate a 
discrete-time duration model for the age at first marriage of young Dutch. As in the aggregate 
data, the results from specifications with unobserved heterogeneity suggest an increase in the 
marriage rate after the introduction of registered partnership and a generally insignificant decline 
after the same-sex marriage law. 
 Even if the average effect of the two laws is insignificant, there can be differential responses 
across various groups in the population. In particular, I find different effects in samples stratified 
by region of residence and by ethnicity, two potential indicators of religiosity and conservative 
views. Individuals living in more conservative municipalities (the Dutch Bible belt) and those 
                                                 
4
 In personal correspondence with the author, Boris Dittrich, former member and floor leader of the Dutch Parlia-
ment, mentioned the use of these arguments during the debate on the same-sex marriage law in the Netherlands. 
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from more conservative ethnicities (Turks, Moroccans, other non-Westerns immigrants) tend to 
marry significantly more after each of the two laws, consistent with them reclaiming the institu-
tion of marriage. In contrast, individuals residing in the more liberal four largest cities tend to 
marry significantly less after each law, consistent either with an acceleration in the deinstitution-
alization of marriage or with them learning about the availability of an alternative institution. 
 My findings indicate that neither the legalization of same-sex marriage nor the introduction 
of registered partnership have significant negative effects on the Dutch different-sex marriage 
rate in the aggregate, but they have several limitations. First, I can only estimate the short-term 
effects of the two laws given how recently they were enacted. Second, the short-term effect of 
the same-sex marriage law cannot be separately identified from the longer-term effect of the reg-
istered partnership law because of the close timing of the two laws. However, to the extent that 
these two effects are of the same sign, my results suggest that both are statistically insignificant. 
Finally, any extrapolation of these results to a different context would need to take into account 
the social and institutional differences with the Netherlands. Despite these limitations, I believe 
this paper makes an important contribution to our understanding of marriage behavior and to the 
same-sex marriage debate by providing the first causal estimates of the short-term effects of 
same-sex marriage laws on different-sex marriage. 
2. Conceptual framework 
In the standard economic marriage model (Becker, 1973, 1974), individuals choose between be-
ing in a relationship (which can only take the form of marriage) or not. This model can be ex-
tended to include alternative family forms such as cohabitation or registered partnerships. Any 
policy or societal change that reduces the benefits of marriage relative to these alternatives would 
presumably lead to fewer couples marrying. 
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 It is theoretically ambiguous how different-sex couples might change their marriage behavior 
following the legalization of same-sex registered partnership and of same-sex marriage. On the 
one hand, the past few decades brought about a “deinstitutionalization of marriage” (Cherlin, 
2004). This trend is characterized by changing social norms towards an increased acceptance of 
non-traditional family forms, leading to a declining marriage rate. The introduction of same-sex 
registered partnership and of same-sex marriage could accelerate the change in social norms and 
thus the decline in different-sex marriage (Kurtz, 2004b).5 Individuals with different degrees of 
conservatism or religiousness might respond in potentially different ways to the changing social 
norms as previous research found a strong relationship between religiosity (or conservatism) and 
marriage attitudes and behavior (Allgood et al., 2008; Mahoney, 2010; Village et al., 2010). In 
addition, since registered partnership is available to all couples in the Netherlands, different-sex 
couples have yet another choice of family form which may reduce their incentives to marry. 
 It is also possible that the legalization of same-sex registered partnership and of same-sex 
marriage increases the different-sex marriage rate. The legalization of same-sex marriage can be 
interpreted an institutionalization of same-sex relationships (Lauer and Yodanis, 2010) that could 
reignite the interest of different-sex couples in marriage (Mello, 2004; Cahill, 2004; Safire, 
2003). In addition, granting same-sex couples marriage-like benefits, either via marriage or reg-
istered partnership, could reduce the pressure on governments and employers to provide cohabit-
ing couples similar rights to married couples. This, in turn, could slow down the decline in the 
relative value of marriage (Rauch, 2004). Finally, Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) identity theory 
suggests that some individuals might perceive marriage as an exclusive institution to which only 
certain couples (specifically, different-sex) have access. The introduction of same-sex registered 
                                                 
5
 Cherlin (2004) specifically mentions same-sex marriage as an indicator of changing social norms. 
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partnership might make marriage a “purer” institution, but the opening of marriage to same-sex 
couples could lead to a loss of identity. In response, some different-sex couples could enhance 
certain behaviors related to marriage (e.g., choosing a religious wedding ceremony) or “act out” 
(marry more) in order to “reclaim the institution of marriage.” 
 Finally, these theoretical models suggest that any effect of same-sex marriage or registered 
partnership laws should be observed on new marriages and particularly first marriages, because 
most of the marriage-specific social and economic costs are already sunk in existing marriages.6 
3. The Dutch legal environment 
The road to same-sex marriage in the Netherlands was long and bumpy.7 As early as 1991, Dutch 
gay rights organizations suggested the creation of a symbolic registry which could potentially 
evolve into an alternative to the marriage registry and to which municipalities would participate 
voluntarily. More than 100 of the 650 Dutch municipalities decided to participate within the first 
year. In response, the government set up a committee of legal advisers (the First Kortmann 
Committee) to inquire into the effects and the desirability of the legal recognition of same-sex 
couples. The committee recommended a Danish-style partnership and a bill to that effect was 
introduced in Parliament in 1993, but was held up because of the 1994 elections. The new gov-
erning coalition, which did not include Christian Democrats (the largest party opposing same-sex 
marriage), suggested a registered partnership open to both same-sex and different-sex couples to 
avoid discrimination on sexual orientation (Merin, 2002). As a result, registered partnership was 
                                                 
6
 They also suggest that it might be misleading to examine divorces in the aftermath of same-sex marriage laws. If 
there is a decline in different-sex marriage, then only couples who have relatively strong reasons to marry would 
choose to do so, thus reducing the divorce rate. 
7
 The presentation in this section draws extensively on Merin (2002) and Curry-Sumner (2006). 
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designed to be an almost perfect substitute to marriage. Waaldijk (2004) compares the rights and 
obligations from both contracts and finds only three differences for different-sex couples. First, 
the paternity of a child born in different-sex marriage is automatically assigned to the man, but in 
a registered partnership he has to explicitly claim it, although this is rather a formality. Second, 
while both contracts can be terminated in court, registered partnerships can also be dissolved at 
the civil registry by mutual agreement.8 Finally, couples in registered partnerships cannot engage 
in international adoptions, although this does not prevent one partner from adopting a child as a 
single individual and the other partner subsequently adopting the child as the partner of the adop-
tive parent. 
 There was still an argument that same-sex couples faced discrimination as they could not 
marry and a motion to this effect was introduced in 1996, leading the government to appoint a 
new panel of experts (the Second Kortmann Committee) to analyze the issue. In the meantime, 
the registered partnership bill was signed into law and become effective on January 1, 1998.  
 The Second Kortmann Committee report, released in October 1997, recommended the legali-
zation of same-sex marriage while dismissing the arguments against it, particularly the issue of a 
possible negative effect on different-sex marriage: “The argument that a large part of the popula-
tion would no longer be able to identify with marriage if it were opened up applies to an ever 
diminishing part of society. They can continue to identify with a marriage in church.” (Kortmann 
Commissie, 1997, author’s translation) The 1998 elections kept the same coalition in power and 
an agreement was reached on the introduction of a same-sex marriage bill during that term. That 
                                                 
8
 Starting from 2001, married couples can change their marriage into a registered partnership. Statistics Netherlands 
reports that more than 90% of these changes are followed by partnership dissolution by mutual agreement, a proce-
dure called “flash divorce.” This is a cheaper alternative to divorce when the parties agree on the division of proper-
ty. Therefore, I only consider new partnerships in the empirical analysis. 
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bill was introduced in Parliament in 2000, was approved in September by the lower chamber and 
in December by the upper chamber, and became effective on April 1, 2001 (Merin, 2002). 
 In conclusion, both same-sex and different-sex couples can form registered partnerships start-
ing from 1998 and same-sex couples are allowed to marry since 2001. For the purpose of this 
paper, the uncertainty in the timing of the laws makes them “exogenous” to marriage decisions, 
as individuals could not perfectly anticipate the enactment date of each law and marriages would 
already be planned by the time the laws were announced. 
4. Aggregate-level analysis 
4.1. Empirical strategy 
Since the two laws apply to all Dutch residents, there is no control group within the Netherlands 
that provides the counterfactual marriage behavior of Dutch residents in the absence of the laws. 
At the same time, using a different country as a counterfactual can be problematic because of 
differences in attitudes toward marriage.9 In the absence of an obvious control group, Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) suggest creating a synthetic control, a weighted 
average of potential “donor” countries such that the averages of the synthetic marriage rate and 
its determinant variables closely match the corresponding numbers for the Netherlands during 
the “pre-intervention period” (before the enactment of the registered partnership law).10 
 Specifically, let  be a vector of marriage determinants,  the marriage rate, subscript 1 rep-
resent the Netherlands, subscript 0 the set of donor countries, and   	
 , and  
                                                 
9
 Belgium is an obvious choice for a control country, but Belgium enacted a registered partnership law in 2000 and a 
same-sex marriage law in 2003. 
10
 Other cross-country studies using the synthetic control method include Billmeier and Nannicini (forthcoming), 
Cavallo et al. (2011), Lee (2011) and Nannicini and Billmeier (2011). 
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	
 ,, where the overline represents means over the pre-intervention period. The synthetic 
control is the set of weights that minimize the weighted distance between the pre-intervention 
averages for the Netherlands and for synthetic Netherlands: 
  argmin   
  , 
where  is a diagonal matrix of variable loadings. Similar to Abadie et al. (2010), the matrix   
is chosen so as to minimize the mean squared error in the pre-intervention period: 
  argmin  
 . 
 To summarize, the synthetic control is constructed by assigning a set of data-driven weights 
to potential donor countries such that the weighted average of their marriage rates and of their 
determinant variables closely match the corresponding averages in the Netherlands during the 
pre-intervention period. These weights are the result of a two-step optimization. In the first step, 
each variable is assigned a loading and the country weights are calculated as a function of these 
loadings to minimize the weighted distance between the synthetic control and the Netherlands. In 
the second step, the variable loadings are chosen so that the synthetic marriage rate matches the 
actual marriage rate as closely as possible, and the two steps are repeated until convergence is 
reached. By using both the determinants of the marriage rate and the pre-intervention marriage 
rate itself, the synthetic control method takes into account both the observable and the unobserv-
able determinants of the dependent variable and produces an appropriate counterfactual for the 
evolution of the marriage rate in the absence of the two laws. See Appendix A1 for more details. 
4.2. Data 
The list of potential donors includes the 16 OECD member countries that did not enact a regis-
tered partnership or same-sex marriage law until 2005 and for which data was available: Austral-
ia, Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Po-
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land, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.11 Despite the 
likely differences between these countries and the Netherlands with respect to the rights offered 
to unmarried couples, this is arguably the set of countries most comparable to the Netherlands.12 
 The pre-intervention period includes the years 1988–1997. Marriage is measured as the crude 
marriage rate, defined as the total number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants.13 The variables 
included in the vector of determinants  can be classified into three groups. The first group of 
variables describes the number of people at risk of marriage and the probability that they will 
meet, or the thickness of the marriage market: the fraction of the population in the 25–44 age 
group, the fraction of the population living in urban areas, the sex ratio, and the life expectancy 
of both men and women. The second set of variables characterizes the attractiveness of individu-
als in the marriage market: the share of girls in total enrollment in secondary and in tertiary edu-
cation, and total fertility rate. The variables in the third group, the unemployment rate of both 
men and women in the 25–34 age group and the GDP per capita, describe business cycle fluctua-
tions. Finally, I use the annual growth rate of the marriage rate and the fraction of respondents 
who agreed with the statement “Marriage is an out-dated institution” in the World Values Survey 
                                                 
11
 The Civil Union Act in New Zealand came into effect on April 26, 2005, and the Civil Partnership Act came into 
effect in the United Kingdom in December 2005. 
12
 The results are robust to restricting the set of donors to countries presumably more similar to the Netherlands, 
such as the European OECD member countries. 
13
 The ideal measure would use only the population at risk, i.e., single individuals legally allowed to marry, but this 
is not commonly reported by statistical agencies. Appendix Figure A1 shows that both measures follow similar 
patterns in the Netherlands, with smaller relative increases and larger relative declines in the “correct” marriage rate. 
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to account for the long-term trend in the attitude toward the institution of marriage.14 A list of the 
data sources for each country is provided in Appendix Table A1. 
 The first two columns of Table 1 list the averages of each variable for the Netherlands and 
for the group of potential donors (the unweighted average) for the period 1988-1997. The rela-
tively large differences for certain variables suggest that the unweighted average of the potential 
donors might not be an appropriate control group. 
4.3. Results 
The means of all the variables for the synthetic control are listed in column 3 of Table 1.15 In 
general, they are much closer to the corresponding values for the Netherlands (column 1) than 
the unweighted averages of potential donors (column 2). Indeed, the largest relative difference 
between columns 1 and 3 is almost half of the largest relative difference between columns 1 and 
2. Finally, column 4 lists the loadings rescaled to sum up to one and shows that the variables 
with the largest contribution are mostly related to women and fertility. 
 In addition to the overall marriage rate, it is interesting to look at the different-sex marriage 
rate since the arguments in section 2 refer to the behavior of different-sex couples. It could also 
be argued that what should matter is the rate of unions (i.e., marriages and registered partner-
ships) rather than just marriages because some different-sex couples might choose registered 
partnership over marriage if they are perceived as near-perfect substitutes. Note that these three 
                                                 
14
 The results are robust to the inclusion of additional variables, such as the fraction of the population in the 20–39 
age group, the crude birth rate, the share of girls total enrollment in primary education, the labor force participation 
rate of men and women in the 25–34 age group, the inflation rate, and the GDP growth rate. 
15
 The weights of each donor country in the synthetic control are listed in Appendix Table A2. Four countries (in 
order: Austria, Italy, Switzerland and Australia) account for over 90 percent of the synthetic control. 
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measures of union formation are the same prior to 1998 and that the counterfactual in each case 
is the same: what the marriage rate would have been in the absence of the two laws. 
 Figure 1 plots the overall marriage rate in the Netherlands and synthetic Netherlands, while 
Figure 2 plots the different-sex marriage rate (panel a) and different-sex union rate (panel b) 
against the same synthetic rate. As expected, the actual rates are relatively close to the synthetic 
marriage rate between 1988–1997, the period used to construct the synthetic control. After the 
introduction of registered partnership, the three rates are all higher than the synthetic marriage 
rate, but they all fall below the synthetic rate at some point after 2001, the date when same-sex 
marriage was legalized. 
 To determine the statistical significance of the actual-synthetic difference after 1998, I con-
duct permutation experiments (Abadie et al., 2010) in which the Netherlands is assigned to the 
donor pool, one of the donors is considered “treated” and a synthetic control for this new “treat-
ed” group is constructed. I restrict the analysis to the donors with a reasonably close fit in the 
pre-intervention period as measured by mean square prediction errors ( !").16 Figure 3 plots 
the gaps between the actual and the synthetic rates for the Netherlands (the dark lines) and for 
the donors with  !" at most five times (panel a) or twice (panel b) as large as the Netherlands 
(the grey lines). The gap for the Netherlands is always within the range produced by the permu-
tation tests. In other words, if a random country were picked from these restricted donor pool, the 
chance of finding an actual-synthetic gap in the post-1998 marriage rate comparable to the one in 
the Netherlands is 10% (corresponding to the 10 solid lines in panel a) or 12.57% (corresponding 
to the 8 solid lines in panel b), levels similar to common statistical tests. Therefore, we can con-
                                                 
16
 The mean squared prediction error is the mean squared error of the synthetic marriage rate relative to the actual 
marriage rate during the pre-intervention period:  !"  #$∑ & &'#$&( . 
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clude that the evolution of the Dutch marriage rate, whether overall or only for different-sex 
couples, is not statistically different after the enactment of each law from its evolution in the ab-
sence of these laws.17 
 The particular setup of the two laws makes it impossible to separate the long-term effects of 
the registered partnership law (beyond the first three years) from the short-term effects of the 
same-sex marriage law. However, if these two laws have an effect on the institution of marriage, 
it is likely that they act in the same direction (see section 2). In this case, the results in this sec-
tion suggests that each of the two effects is insignificant. 
5. Individual-level analysis 
5.1. Empirical strategy 
The individual-level analysis mirrors the aggregate analysis by estimating the effect of the two 
laws on the probability of marriage. In particular, I confine the analysis to never-married indi-
viduals and thus first marriages because previously-married individuals are likely to attribute a 
value to marriage that might not be influenced by changes in its definition.18 The baseline speci-
fication is 
 !)*  1|)*,  0   -)*, .!*, .! *; 0), (1) 
where )* is an indicator for individual 1 marrying during year 2, and )* is a vector of observa-
ble and potentially time-varying characteristics. The main variables of interest are .!*, a dummy 
variable for the period following the registered partnership law (1998–2000), and .! * for the 
period following the same-sex marriage law (2001–2005). This model has the structure of a dis-
                                                 
17
 The Appendix details a second type of test that confirms this conclusion. 
18
 This is not restrictive, as Appendix Figure A3 shows that the variation in the total number of marriages is driven 
by the variation in the number of first marriages. 
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crete-time duration model with first marriage as the event, -3 as the hazard function and age at 
first marriage as duration. Formally, let 4) be the random variable representing the age at first 
marriage age of individual 1, 5 the age of individual 1 in year 2, and 6) the last observed age of 
the individual, all measured in full years at the end of year 2. As in several other studies (e.g., 
Nickell, 1979; Ham and Rea, 1987), I assume that the hazard function -3 has the logit form: 
 -)*, .!*, .! *; 0)  ! 4)  5|4) 7 5  -)5; 0)  11 8 exp <=)5; 0)> , (2) 
where 
 =)5; 0)  0) 8 )&
  ? 8 .!&@ 8 .! &@' 8 2@A 8 B5, (3) 
2 represents a linear trend, 0) captures the unobserved characteristics of the individual and fol-
lows a discrete distribution with two mass points, 0C and 0C' (Heckman and Singer, 1984), and 
B3 represents duration dependence, the common way age influences the probability of marriage 
for any given person.19 
 The two coefficients of interest, @ and @', capture the effects of each law on the age-specific 
conditional probability in the corresponding period as compared to the period before 1998,  
measured as deviations from the long-term trend in the marriage rate.20 The identifying assump-
                                                 
19
 The most flexible form of duration dependence, a step function, leads to identification problems when unobserved 
heterogeneity is also modeled non-parametrically (Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993). Eberwein et al. (2002) argue 
that the actual functional form does not influence the results as long as it is flexible. Based on their suggestion, I add 
higher-order terms in DE5, 5  6FG  17, until they become insignificant. This procedure yields a fourth-order 
polynomial, which produces almost identical estimates to a specification with a full set of age dummies in a model 
without unobserved heterogeneity (available upon request). 
20
 An effect on the propensity to marry at every age during a particular period leads to an effect on the marriage rate 
in that particular period. To facilitate the comparison with the results in section 4, I will loosely interpret the coeffi-
cients in equation (3) as effects on the marriage rate for the rest of the discussion. 
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tion is that the two laws have only level effects (i.e., they do not change the trend in the marriage 
rate) and thus the marriage behavior before 1998 is an appropriate counterfactual for the mar-
riage behavior in the absence of the two laws once the long-term trend is taken into account.21 
This assumption is inherently untestable, but two arguments can be made to support it. First, as it 
will be mentioned in section 5.2, the data covers a relatively short period of time (1995–2005), 
making a change in the long-term trend in the marriage rate less likely. Second, if the pre-1998 
marriage behavior is an appropriate counterfactual for the post-1998 marriage behavior, then the 
actual pre-1998 marriage rate and the synthetic post-1998 marriage rate constructed in section 4 
should be similar. This is confirmed by Appendix Figure A4, which shows that the 1998–2000 
and 2001–2005 synthetic marriage rates are almost parallel to the pre-1998 marriage rate. 
 Finally, the likelihood function for a sample of I individuals is: 
J  K!4)  6)LM!4) N 6),LM ,O)(  
where P) equals one if person 1 is observed to marry and zero otherwise, 6) is the last observed 
age of the individual, and 
!4)  6)  QRST-)6); 0CTK1  -)5; 0CTUM,&(V W
'
T( , 
!4) N 6)  QRST K1 -)5; 0CTUM&(V W
'
T( . 
A random sample of never-married individuals (a stock sample) oversamples individuals who 
prefer to marry late and produces biased estimates, a situation known as the initial conditions 
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 A more flexible approach with a non-linear trend or with different slopes in each period would overfit the varia-
tion in the marriage rate over such a short period. 
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problem. Therefore, the likelihood function should be maximized in a flow sample of individuals 
(i.e., a sample of individuals who become at risk of marriage during the sample period). 
5.2. Data 
I construct the data using ten waves, 1996–2005, of the restricted version of the Dutch Labor 
Force Survey (Enquête Beroepsbevolking, EBB) and the January 2006 snapshot of the confiden-
tial Dutch Municipal Records (Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie, GBA). The EBB is an annual 
cross-sectional survey of the population 15 years of age and older. It includes information on 
educational attainment, ethnicity, and other demographic and labor market characteristics at the 
time of the interview, as well as a unique identification number that can be used to match indi-
viduals to other data sets maintained by Statistics Netherlands. The combined ten waves of the 
survey contain almost 950,000 individuals, approximately 6% of the average Dutch population 
between 1995–2005. To increase the probability that the highest educational level reported does 
not change over the sample period, I only keep from the EBB individuals at least 20 years of age 
during the interview year.22 Using the unique identification number, these individuals are 
matched to their marriage and residence history for the entire 1995–2005 period provided in the 
GBA.23 The resulting longitudinal data set includes information on ethnicity, marital status and 
residence over the entire period, and on educational attainment and school enrollment at the time 
                                                 
22
 About 15 percent of the sample was still enrolled at the time of the survey (approximately 9 percent full-time and 
6 percent part-time). A small fraction of these individuals were enrolled in a lower level than their highest level 
completed (for example, persons with a college degree in science enrolled in professional business courses). The 
highest of the two levels was used in these cases. A complete picture of the Dutch education system is shown in 
Appendix Figure A7. 
23
 For example, the marital status and residence of a person interviewed for the EBB in 2004 at age 24 is observed 
from age 15 (in 1995) until age 25 (in 2005). However, this person can only marry after she turns 18 (in 1998). 
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of the EBB interview. Finally, the data is augmented with the yearly unemployment rate at the 
regional level.24 
 As in the aggregate-level analysis, the control variables measure the attractiveness of an indi-
vidual on the marriage market (5-year age cohort, education and ethnicity), the thickness of the 
market (location of residence, level of urbanization and ethnicity), business cycle fluctuations 
(regional unemployment rate) and the trend in the view on the institution of marriage (linear 
trend). Time is measured in calendar years because of how certain variables such as the regional 
unemployment rate are measured. Moreover, the strong seasonal pattern in marriages within a 
calendar year suggests that marriage decisions are commonly based on the calendar year (see 
Appendix Figure A5). Age is measured in full years at the end of the calendar year (so that indi-
viduals who turn 18 during the year are included in the sample), residence at the beginning of the 
year (under the assumption that most marriage decisions are made in advance), and the regional 
unemployment rate as the calendar-year average. 
 There are several limitations to this data set. First, there is no difference in the recording of 
same-sex and different-sex marriages. Second, I have no information on individuals not inter-
viewed for the EBB, particularly the spouses of individuals in the sample. Finally, the coding of 
addresses changes over time and is aggregated at the street-number level since 2003. As a result, 
it is virtually impossible to identify the spouse of all individuals and I am unable to distinguish 
between same-sex marriages and different-sex marriages. This induces a small upward bias in 
the estimate of the different-sex marriage rate after 2001.25 
                                                 
24
 The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces: Drenthe, Flevoland, Friesland, Gelderland, Groningen, Lim-
burg, Noord-Brabant, Noord-Holland, Overijssel, Utrecht, Zeeland and Zuid-Holland. 
25
 Same-sex marriages represent less than 2 percent of all marriages over the period 2001–2005. 
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 Recall from section 5.1 that the empirical analysis requires a flow sample. However, the 
sample cannot be restricted only to individuals who turn 18 between 1995 and 2005 because of 
the increasingly high average age at first marriage in the Netherlands (from 29.6 for men and 
27.4 for women in 1995 to 32.4 and 29.7 in 2005, respectively). Instead, I include all individuals 
who are first observed at an age such that the probability of having never married is close to one. 
Based on the aggregate distribution of Dutch marriages by age, this yields the intervals 18–24 for 
men and 18–22 for women, which account for about 10% of first marriages between 1995 and 
2005, respectively.26 
 I conduct the analysis separately by gender because women tend to marry earlier than men 
and they are more likely to marry previously-married opposite-sex partners. This also implies 
that there is no one-to-one relationship between marriages in the sample of men and in the sam-
ple of women. The final sample includes 70,718 men and 53,883 women, for which descriptive 
statistics are listed in Table 2.27 
 Compared to the numbers in Table 1, the average person in the sample is younger than the 
average person in the population, with an average age at first marriage around 27 years for men 
and 25 years for women. Consequently, only 26.29% of men and 33.30% of women marry dur-
ing the sample period (see also the Kaplan-Meier estimates in Appendix Figure A6). The distri-
bution of education is skewed toward higher levels of education, mostly professional degrees, 
                                                 
26
 While a relatively small number of the individuals in the flow sample marry by the end of the sample period, the 
coefficients of interest measure the variation in the marriage propensity of individuals of the same age before and 
after the enactment of each law. 
27
 All the statistics and the subsequent analysis use sample weights. These weights are constructed by rescaling the 
weights provided in the EBB to represent the probability of interview relative to the entire sample of ten waves, 
assuming that the population structure does not change significantly during the study period. 
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but with relatively more male university graduates, consistent with the shares of girls in second-
ary and tertiary education in Table 1. Approximately 83% of the sample are natives and almost 
8% are Western immigrants from Europe (except Turkey), North America, Oceania, Japan and 
Indonesia. Immigrants from potentially more conservative areas such as the predominantly Mus-
lim Turkey and Morocco, or from Aruba and Suriname, account for about 6% of both men and 
women. The fraction of the sample living in an urban area when first observed is slightly lower 
than in the population. One explanation is that single people tend to move to cities, where the 
marriage markets are thicker, but (married) couples tend to move out of the cities, where housing 
is cheaper (Gautier et al., 2010).  
 The individual-level data allows me to exploit the geographic heterogeneity with respect to 
attitudes toward marriage. One area of interest groups the four largest cities (Amsterdam, The 
Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht), which have relatively low rates of fertility, marriage and church 
attendance, but high rates of divorce and non-marital birth. A second area is the so-called Dutch 
Bible belt (De Bijbelgordel), a group of municipalities with relatively high church participation 
and fertility rates, together with low rates of cohabitation, divorce and non-marital births 
(Sobotka and Adigüzel, 2002; de Jong, 2003). I include in the Bible belt the municipalities where 
the four conservative Christian parties participating in the 1998 election to the lower-chamber of 
the Dutch Parliament obtained more than 20% of the votes.28 The 32 municipalities in the Bible 
belt are listed in Appendix Table A3 and the two areas of interest are highlighted on the map in 
Appendix Figure A8. 
                                                 
28
 Based on data from the Dutch Electoral Council (de Kiesraad). The four parties are the Reformatory Political 
Federation (Reformatorische Politieke Federatie, RPF), the Reformed Political Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde 
Partij, SGP), the Reformed Political League (Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond, GPV) and the Catholic Political Party 
(Katholiek Politieke Partij, KPP). They obtained 5.17% of the votes at the national level and won 8 out of 150 seats. 
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 As expected, a significantly larger fraction of individuals in the Bible belt marry as compared 
to the sample average (43.13% of men and 52.44% of women, compared to 26.29% and 33.30%, 
respectively), while the opposite holds for the individuals in the four largest cities (20.99% and 
24.64%, respectively). Similarly, marriages contracted in the Bible belt represent a dispropor-
tionately high fraction in the total number of marriages (almost 7%). These statistics confirm that 
the four largest cities comprise some of the more liberal areas in the Netherlands, while the Bible 
belt municipalities include the more conservative. In the rest of the analysis, I include indicators 
for residence in one of these two areas among the control variables. 
5.3. Results 
I first estimate a model without unobserved heterogeneity. The estimation results are listed in 
columns 1 and 3 of Table 3. I then estimate the model with unobserved heterogeneity, shown in 
columns 2 and 4. Note that only coefficient ratios can be compared across specifications since 
changing the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity changes the variance normalization of 
coefficients in logit models (Mroz and Zayats, 2008; Nicoletti and Rondinelli, 2010). 
 As expected, the decline in the marriage rate is attributed to the two laws when not control-
ling for unobserved heterogeneity (columns 1 and 3).29 The estimates show a drop in the mar-
riage probability in each of the two periods for both men and women. Once the unobserved het-
erogeneity is taken into account (columns 2 and 4), the estimates suggest that there is no negative 
                                                 
29
 Suppose that there are two types of individuals: type-A, who wants to marry young, and type-B, who wants to 
marry late. Over time, individuals who marry will exit the sample, and these will predominantly be type-A. As a 
result, the sample will include an increasingly disproportionate number of type-B individuals at any age. Since type-
B individuals marry less than type-A at any age, age-specific marriage rates will be decreasing over time. If unob-
served heterogeneity is ignored, this decline is then incorrectly attributed to the two laws. 
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change in the marriage behavior of individuals after the enactment of each law, with the excep-
tion of young women after the same-sex marriage law. Even in this last case, the decline in the 
marriage probability relative to the long-term trend is less than half than in the case without un-
observed heterogeneity. The first-marriage behavior of young Dutch should be expected to be 
more volatile than in the aggregate analysis, particularly in the case of women. If most of the 
variation in the number of marriages is due to first marriages, the relative change in the first-
marriage rate will be larger because the denominator is smaller (only never-married individuals). 
Still, young women seem to be more responsive than men to changes in their environment, with 
larger relative increases and declines in their marriage hazard relative to the long-term trend.30 
 Some other results are worth noting, such as the fact that most of the patterns in the explana-
tory variables do not change with the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity. Not surprisingly, 
the estimates indicate a negative long-term trend in the marriage rate and a negative effect of 
economic downturns via the unemployment rate. The relationship between education and mar-
riage varies by sex, being almost an inverted-U for men, consistent with male hypogamy (men 
“marrying down”), and an almost linearly decreasing relationship for women, consistent with 
female hypergamy (women “marrying up”).31 Finally, the estimates suggest that certain groups 
have higher or lower propensities to marry irrespective of gender. For instance, immigrants from 
Turkey and Morocco or from other non-Western countries as well as individuals residing in the 
Bible belt are more likely to marry than natives. On the other hand, immigrants from a Western 
country or from Suriname and Aruba are less likely to marry, as are individuals living in urban 
                                                 
30
 The difference in the estimates is entirely driven by the oldest cohort of women (21 and 22 years old in 1995). 
Once these observations are excluded, all the results are qualitatively similar for both men and women. 
31
 In both cases, the omitted category is “senior vocational,” an intermediate level between “general secondary” and 
“higher professional”. 
22 
 
areas, especially in the four largest cities. These patterns suggest that the marriage behavior of 
these groups could be impacted differently by the two laws. 
5.4. Heterogeneous effects 
To take into account the geographic differences in marriage behavior, I modify the hazard func-
tion in equation (3) as follows: 
 =)5; 0)  0) 8 )&
  ? 8 B5 8QX.!&  Y)&Z  @Z 8 .! &  Y)&Z  @'Z 8 2 Y)&Z  @AZ[Z , (4) 
where \ represents one of the three regions defined above (Dutch Bible belt, four largest cities, 
rest of the Netherlands), Y15\  is a dummy for individual 1 residing in region \ at the beginning of 
year 5, and the other variables are the same as before. In this specification, @1\  represents the 
change in the propensity to marry after the enactment of the registered partnership law among 
individuals living in regions \ relative to the period 1995–1997 in that same region, and @2\  
measures the corresponding effect for the same-sex marriage law. Finally, @3\  measures the long-
term trend in the age-specific marriage rate in region \. 
 The results are listed in Table 4 and indicate that individuals in the Bible belt have the high-
est baseline tendency to marry and the slowest-declining long-term trend among the three 
groups, while people in the four largest cities have the lowest baseline marriage probability and 
the fastest-declining long-term trend. The response to the two laws is also markedly different 
across the three regions. The marriage rate increases in the Bible belt after the registered partner-
ship law and then even more after the same-sex marriage law. For example, the increase in the 
marriage rate of men after the legalization of same-sex marriage is about nine times the year-to-
year variation in their marriage rate over the sample period. In contrast, individuals in the four 
largest cities marry less after the registered partnership law and even less after the same-sex mar-
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riage law. The decline in their marriage rate after the same-sex marriage law is about twice as 
large as the yearly decline in their marriage rate. Finally, individuals living in the rest of the 
country marry more after the registered partnership law and then return to their long-term trend 
after the same-sex marriage law, similar to the overall results in the previous section. 
 Next, I study the marriage behavior of individuals of different ethnicities.32 The hazard func-
tion has the same form as in equation (4), where \ now represents one of the five ethnic groups 
(Dutch natives, Western immigrants, Surinamese/Arubans, Turks/Moroccans, other non-Western 
immigrants) and Y1\ is a dummy for individual 1 being of ethnicity \. The coefficients of interest 
have a similar interpretation as before but with respect to ethnicity \. 
 Table 5 presents the results. Relatively more conservative men (Turks/Morrocans, Suri-
namese/Arubans and other non-Western immigrants) marry more after the registered partnership 
law and then at least as much after the same-sex marriage law. For instance, the marriage rate of 
Turkish and Moroccan men increases by approximately 3.5 times the yearly variation in their 
marriage rate over the sample period after the legalization of same-sex marriage. Dutch natives 
and Western immigrants, on the other hand, tend to have a behavior similar to the overall popula-
tion, with a marriage rate around or higher than its long-term trend after the registered partner-
ship law and then falling after the same-sex marriage law. For example, the marriage rate of 
Western immigrant men falls by almost the same amount as the yearly decline in their marriage 
rate after the same-sex marriage law. For women, all immigrant ethnic groups experience an in-
crease in their marriage hazard after the registered partnership law and a slight decline after the 
                                                 
32
 Appendix Table A4 shows various measures of religiosity for individuals of different ethnicities extracted from 
the World Values Survey and from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences. The Table shows that 
Turks, Moroccan, Arubans, Surinamese and individuals of non-Western descent are on average more conservative 
than native Dutch or individuals of Western descent. 
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same-sex marriage law while still above the long-term trend. Finally, native Dutch women show 
a pattern similar to the overall results. 
 These results indicate significant variation in the response to the two laws. The presumably 
conservative individuals residing in the Bible belt or of non-Western ethnicities seem to be af-
fected by each law and have marriage probabilities significantly above their long-term trend in 
each period, consistent with them “reclaiming the institution of marriage” along the lines of 
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) identity theory. Presumably liberal individuals such as those living 
in the four largest cities marry less after the introduction of each law, not always statistically 
significant, consistent either with an acceleration in the deinstitutionalization of marriage, or with 
them learning about the availability of an alternative institution.33 
6. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the same-sex marriage debate by providing the first causal estimates to 
the question of whether opening the institution of marriage to same-sex couples would have neg-
ative consequences on the institution of marriage, particularly for different-sex couples. I focus 
on the Netherlands, the first country to legalize same-sex marriage in 2001. Overall, I do not find 
evidence of negative effects from the legalization of same-sex marriage or from the introduction 
of registered partnership. However, the response to the two laws varies across regions and eth-
nicities, with potentially more conservative individuals marrying statistically significantly more 
after each law and presumably more liberal individuals marrying increasingly less (though not 
always statistically significant) after each of the two laws. These patterns provide suggestive 
evidence in support of some of the theories of marriage behavior presented in section 2. 
                                                 
33
 Boele-Woelki et al. (2007) report case studies of cohabiting couples entering registered partnership after being 
informed of its existence and its similitude to marriage. 
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 There are three caveats to the present study. First, any analysis to date can provide infor-
mation only on the short-term effects of the two laws because of their recent enactment. Second, 
it is practically impossible to separate the short-term effect of the same-sex marriage law from 
the longer-term effect of the registered partnership law because of the timing of the two laws. 
Since the two effects plausibly have the same sign, my results suggest that both are statistically 
insignificant. Finally, any extrapolation of the results needs to take into account the social and 
institutional differences between other countries and the Netherlands. Despite these limitations, I 
believe my analysis makes an important contribution to our understanding of marriage behavior 
and to the same-sex marriage debate. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and loadings for the variables used in the synthetic control method 
 Mean, 1988–1997 Variable 
Loading 
 Netherlands Potential donors 
Synthetic 
Netherlands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Crude marriage rate 5.83 6.45 5.91  
Population, age 25-44 (%) 32.32 29.57 30.37 0.000 
Urban population (%) 70.87 69.08 70.44 0.034 
Sex ratio 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.000 
Life expectancy, men (years) 74.26 71.58 73.49 0.012 
Life expectancy, women (years) 80.21 78.13 79.88 0.000 
Girls share in secondary education (%) 47.54 48.58 47.64 0.250 
Girls share in tertiary education (%) 46.56 47.99 46.44 0.239 
Fertility rate 1.57 1.75 1.57 0.281 
Unemployment rate, men, age 25-34 (%) 5.67 6.98 5.74 0.036 
Unemployment rate, women, age 25-34 (%) 8.17 8.94 8.34 0.039 
GDP per capita 19,583.48 15,017.01 20,315.45 0.017 
View on the marriage institution 21.20 13.53 14.73 0.000 
Growth rate of marriage rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.092 
Notes: Columns 1–3 show the mean of the corresponding variables over the period 1988–1997, with the exception 
of the marriage views variable, which is averaged over 1988–2000 for the donor countries. Column 2 includes sim-
ple averages of the countries in the donor group and column 3 includes weighted averages using the weights pro-
duced by the synthetic control method. Column 4 lists variable loadings (the diagonal elements of matrix ), re-
scaled so as to sum up to one. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Men 
(%) 
Women 
(%) 
First marriages 
  
 Percent 26.29 33.30 
 Average age (years) 27.37 25.25 
 
(2.97) (2.96) 
Censored observations 
  
 Percent 73.71 66.70 
 Average age (years) 28.19 26.96 
 
(3.70) (3.23) 
Birth cohort 
  
 1970-74 41.04 23.79 
 1975-1979 39.54 51.19 
 1980-1984 18.43 23.79 
 1985-1989 0.99 1.23 
Education 
  
 Primary education 4.24 3.03 
 Secondary vocational 16.83 12.95 
 General secondary 6.83 7.10 
 Senior vocational 39.88 39.85 
 Higher professional 23.16 28.39 
 College 9.05 8.67 
Ethnicity 
  
 Natives 83.11 82.85 
 Western immigrants 7.71 7.80 
 Turks/Moroccans 3.21 3.43 
 Surinamese/Arubans 3.01 3.26 
 Other non-Western immigrants 2.97 2.66 
Residence in urban area at entry into sample 62.86 63.79 
Four largest cities 
  
 Residence at entry into sample 10.23 10.55 
 Percent of total marriages 12.11 12.03 
 Percent of residents marrying 20.99 24.64 
Bible belt 
  
 Residence at entry into sample 4.35 4.35 
 Percent of total marriages 6.93 6.66 
 Percent of residents marrying 43.13 52.44 
Number of individuals 70,717 53,799 
Notes: Never-married individuals aged 18-22 (men) or 18–24 (women) in 1995 or who turned 18 years of age be-
tween 1996–2005. All statistics are weighted using sample weights. 
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Table 3: Discrete-time duration model for age at first marriage 
 Men (N = 70,717)   Women (N = 53,799) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period 1 (1998–2000) -0.016 0.032 -0.038* 0.054* 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Period 2 (2001–2005) -0.048* 0.002 -0.180* -0.078* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) 
Linear trend (1995=0) -0.039* -0.040* -0.028* -0.028* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Education (omitted category: Senior vocational) 
 Primary education -0.264* -0.121* 0.009 0.532* 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.022) 
 Secondary vocational -0.060* 0.037* 0.092* 0.379* 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) 
 General secondary -0.348* -0.509* -0.272* -0.427* 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
 Higher professional -0.166* -0.333* -0.395* -0.688* 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
 University -0.171* -0.393* -0.642* -1.096* 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
Ethnicity (omitted category: Natives) 
 Western immigrants -0.148* -0.165* -0.192* -0.161* 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) 
 Turks/Moroccans 1.278* 2.312* 1.616* 2.867* 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.018) 
 Surinamese/Arubans -0.145* -0.069* -0.321* -0.152* 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.024) 
 Other non-Western 0.144* 0.238* -0.005 0.177* 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.023) 
Unemployment rate -0.027* -0.027* -0.017* -0.016* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urban indicator -0.154* -0.178* -0.227* -0.311* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Bible belt 0.767* 1.106* 0.705* 1.080* 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) 
Four largest cities -0.236* -0.361* -0.259* -0.355* 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) 
Unobserved heterogeneity no yes no yes 
log L / 1000 -983.130 -978.405 -872.522 -863.108 
Notes: Sample of never-married individuals aged 18-24 (men) or 18–22 (women) in 1995 or who turned 18 years of 
age between 1996–2005. All specifications include five-year birth cohort dummies and a fourth-degree polynomial 
in DE6FG  17 and are weighted using sample weights. The unobserved heterogeneity term is drawn from a dis-
crete distribution with 2 mass points. Starred coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 4: Discrete-time duration model for age at first marriage, by location 
 Men 
 (N = 70,717, log L / 1000 = -978.205) 
 Bible belt Four largest cities Rest of the Netherlands 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Main effect 1.041* -0.130* – 
 (0.023) (0.022)  
Period 1 (1998–2000) 0.250* -0.101* 0.080* 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.014) 
Period 2 (2001–2005) 0.308* -0.114* 0.034 
 (0.025) (0.043) (0.020) 
Linear trend (1995=0) -0.033* -0.055* -0.040* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
 
 
Women 
 (N = 53,799, log L / 1000 = -862.592) 
 Bible belt Four largest cities Rest of the Netherlands 
Main effect 1.086* 0.004 – 
 (0.023) (0.022)  
Period 1 (1998--2000) 0.388* -0.037 0.085* 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.015) 
Period 2 (2001--2005) 0.440* -0.359* -0.030 
 (0.028) (0.046) (0.021) 
Linear trend (1995=0) -0.051* -0.051* -0.027* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Notes: Discrete-time duration model with unobserved heterogeneity for age at first marriage using a sample of nev-
er-married individuals aged 18-24 (men) or 18–22 (women) in 1995 or who turned 18 years of age between 1996–
2005. All specifications include a fourth-degree polynomial in DE6FG  17, the regional unemployment rate, and 
dummies for five-year birth cohort, ethnicity, education and residence in an urban area. All specifications are 
weighted using sample weights. The unobserved heterogeneity term is drawn from a discrete distribution with 2 
mass points. Starred coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5: Discrete-time duration model for age at first marriage, by ethnicity 
 Men 
 (N = 70,717, log L / 1000 = -977.941) 
 Natives Western immigrants 
Turks/ 
Moroccans 
Surinamese/ 
Arubans 
Other Non-
Western 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Main effect – -0.040 2.648* 0.373* 0.151* 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.046) (0.051) 
Period 1 (1998--2000) -0.018 0.133* 0.446* 0.418* 0.346* 
 (0.014) (0.038) (0.040) (0.062) (0.065) 
Period 2 (2001--2005) -0.054* -0.047 0.621* 0.671* 0.292* 
 (0.020) (0.059) (0.067) (0.096) (0.097) 
Linear trend (1995=0) -0.025* -0.056* -0.185* -0.194* -0.063* 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) 
 
 
Women 
 (N = 53,799, log L / 1000 = -861.873) 
 Natives Western immigrants 
Turks/ 
Moroccans 
Surinamese/ 
Arubans 
Other Non-
Western 
Main effect – 0.087* 3.131* 0.976* 0.886* 
  (0.030) (0.028) (0.042) (0.045) 
Period 1 (1998--2000) -0.003 0.281* 0.461* 0.237* 0.091 
 (0.015) (0.040) (0.040) (0.062) (0.064) 
Period 2 (2001--2005) -0.141* 0.275* 0.247* 0.226 -0.267 
 (0.021) (0.061) (0.071) (0.103) (0.107) 
Linear trend (1995=0) -0.007 -0.108* -0.128* -0.260* -0.133* 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
Notes: Discrete-time duration model with unobserved heterogeneity for age at first marriage using a sample of nev-
er-married individuals aged 18-24 (men) or 18–22 (women) in 1995 or who turned 18 years of age between 1996–
2005. All specifications include a fourth-degree polynomial in DE6FG  17, the regional unemployment rate, and 
dummies for five-year birth cohort, ethnicity, education and residence in an urban area. All specifications are 
weighted using sample weights. The unobserved heterogeneity term is drawn from a discrete distribution with 2 
mass points. Starred coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 Figure 1: Evolution of marriage rate in 
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the Netherlands and in the synthetic control
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Alternative measures of different
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(a) Different-sex marriage rate 
 
(b) Different-sex unions rate 
 
-sex union formation
 
 
 
 (a) At most 5 times the MSPE of the Netherlands
(b) At most 
Figure 3: Comparison of actual
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